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hoped to obtain additional funding to extend the project 
after its close in July 2002, to appraise and add to the 
database collections outside academia and the national 
libraries. Such libraries include the Inns of Court, 
Government departments, the Public Record Office and 
major public libraries. Also, the project needs to move to 
a further phase envisaged by the project partner libraries: 
the use of the database to draw up a national collection 
development strategy for foreign, international and 
comparative law.
In addition, if funding can be obtained there are several 
additional databases that could be built, to aid 
interrogation of FLAG and foreign law research generally. 
First, a series of brief descriptions of the law literature of
each country could be compiled, to assist users identify 
the types of legal material appropriate to their research 
needs and, second, a searchable, world list of citation 
abbreviations.
With the addition of these features, FLAG has the 
potential to become a major foreign law hub on the 
Internet, of value to law researchers not only in the UK 
but worldwide.®
Peter Clinch
Project Manager, Foreign Law Guide 




As the result of the commercial use of the Internet, large numbers of 
commentators discuss the need to authenticate the identity of an individual or 
a transaction. Whilst this article will consider what is meant by authentication, 
the author has reached the conclusion that it will always be difficult to ascertain 
the true identity of a person who uses the Internet for banking.
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ya uthentication is the process by which a person or 
/ % legal entity seeks to verify the validity or genuineness 
A. JLof a particular piece of information. In certain 
circumstances, there is a need to verify the identity of an 
individual or legal entity. Discussions relating to 
authentication over the Internet have failed to grasp that a 
bank cannot verify the identity of an individual or legal entity 
over the Internet with any certainty. At best, a bank must put 
sufficient safeguards in place to reduce the risk of dealing 
widi somebody other than their customer over the Internet.
AUTHENTICATION FOR A PURPOSE
It is not always necessary to establish the identity of a 
person or legal entity for a transaction to take place. 
Providing both parties to the barter are happy to buy and 
sell a product or service using a trusted means of 
exchange, both buyer and seller will part, comfortable that 
each has reached an amicable bargain. It may be thato J
neither party to the trade will wish, or need, to meet again.
However, if something goes wrong with the transaction 
for any reason, one party may wish to pursue the other to
resolve the matter. Depending on the nature of the dispute 
and what action the complaining party intends to take to 
seek a remedy, it may be necessary to establish the identity 
of the party causing the problem.
An everyday example: validating the means of 
exchange
When we deal directly with other people, the need to 
authenticate the identity of the other party depends on a 
number of factors, including the nature of the goods or 
services sold and any legal or regulatory requirements. 
Where there is no requirement or need to authenticate 
the identity of a person or legal entity, both the buyer and 
the seller assess the risk involved with the transaction. For 
instance, a buyer may decide to purchase a DVD on a 
Saturday market stall. If the buyer knows the trader from 
whom they intend to buy the DVD, a certain level of trust 
will already exist between the two. As a result, any 
transaction that takes place will be founded on mutual 
recognition and the knowledge by both parties that if 
something goes wrong, each knows how to contact the
o o o'
other to effect a remedy.
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However, where the buyer is passing through a town and 
is unlikely to make a return visit, the potential buyer takes 
different factors into account than the local buyer. An 
outsider will use what intuition their life experience has 
taught them to assess whether to trust each seller in the
o
market. In this set of circumstances, it is unlikely that the 
transient buyer is concerned about authenticating the 
identity of any of the store holders. The buyer will evaluate 
the physical signals they observe about the seller of DVDs. 
Their response, and whether to trust the seller, will be one 
part ot the process in deciding to buy. Another consideration 
will be the potential loss they may suffer if they buy a DVD 
that does not work. If the buyer considers it is worth taking 
the risk, because the likely loss is negligible, then they may 
buy from the unknown seller if the other signals they have 
processed establish the seller is to be trusted.
Similarly, the seller, if they do not know the identity of 
the buyer, will enter the transaction if the medium of 
exchange is to be trusted. Whether the buyer pays in cash 
or by way of a cheque or credit card, the buyer is able to 
carry out a procedure that goes some way to establishing 
the authenticity of the medium of exchange.
Cash
If cash is proffered, tests of look and feel help to 
establish the genuineness of the notes and coins proffered. 
It may be the seller also uses a device to check whether 
paper money is legitimate or a forgery.
Cheque
Where a cheque is offered, certain formalities are 
required to guarantee payment of the amount written on 
the cheque by the issuing bank:
• the buyer writes the correct date, the amount in figures 
and numerals and signs the cheque with their 
manuscript signature in the presence of the seller, and
• the seller writes down the unique number on the reverse 
of the cheque (which is found on the cheque guarantee 
card that in turn corresponds to the bank account as 
printed on the face of the cheque), ensures the 
information written by the seller on the cheque is 
correct and compares the signature on the cheque 
guarantee card against the signature written by the buyer 
in the presence of the seller.
Once these formalities are satisfactorily completed, the 
seller can rest assured that in normal circumstances, the 
issuing bank will honour the cheque and cause the seller's 
bank account to be credited with the amount on the cheque.
Credit card
A credit card is dealt with slightly differently, in that the 
credit card is processed either through an electronic 
authentication system, or a copy of the information on the 
credit card is transferred to a paper record of the
transaction by an impression. In both instances, a paper 
record is created and signed by the buyer, acknowledging 
receipt of goods to the value printed recorded.
The buyer is required to compare the signature on the 
paper record to that on the reverse of the credit card. 
Clearly, the method of entering a transaction by means of 
the electronic authentication system is safer for the seller, 
because they will be informed in real time if the 
transaction is not authorised. Where the transaction is by 
way of an impression of the credit card details on to paper, 
the seller is obliged to establish, by looking through a list 
of cancelled credit card numbers, whether this particular 
credit card has been revoked tor some reason.
Whichever method of exchange is used—cash, credito '
card or cheque—the seller is not identifying the identity of 
the buyer. They are merely seeking to establish the validity 
of the means of exchange. The buyer is assumed, in most 
circumstances, to be the legitimate user of the cheque and 
cheque guarantee card. However, neither the cheque nor 
the accompanying cheque guarantee card is evidence that 
the person in possession of these items is the person 
whose name appears on the documents.
AUTHENTICATING THE CUSTOMER FOR THE 
FIRST TIME
Before opening a bank account for a person or legal 
entity, the bank demands the future customer provides a 
certain number of documents to authenticate their 
identity. The range of documentary evidence required to 
open an account is usually sufficient to establish the 
identity of the person or legal entity with some certainty. 
Whilst a small percentage of customers will succeed in 
opening an account under a false identity with intent to 
defraud, by constantly monitoring accounts, banks can 
reduce their exposure in such circumstances.
Risks with the Internet
Using the Internet is risky. The specification for the 
internet was simple: if a command to launch a nuclear 
weapon was issued, it was to reach its destination, no 
matter how much damage had occurred to the 
infrastructure. The taxpayer paid for an excellent 'open' 
system. However, an open system means anybody can use 
it, and some very clever people have used various methods 
to disrupt commercial activities on the Internet.
• Hackers can impersonate a legitimate customer by 
obtaining their account number, password, personal 
identification number and e-mail address by various 
means, including the use of a sniffer, which is a device 
that eavesdrops on telecommunications traffic, 
capturing information as it moves over the Internet.
• It is possible for a third party to direct visitors to a ghost 
web site, which is an exact replica of the web site the 
visitor thinks they have visited. A ghost web site is set up 23
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to obtain information from visitors - from credit card 
details to names and addresses. The aim is to obtain 
sufficient information relating to the identity of an
O j
individual to use it improperly. 
• Alternatively, having visited a legitimate web site, the
J ' O O '
visitor may decide to enter a contract for goods or 
services and pay by entering number of the their credit 
online. It is possible, at this point in the process, for the 
seller to provide information that can be intercepted by 
a third party as it is transmitted to the buyer.
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) have listed a 
number of other risks in their discussion paper 'The FSA's 
approach to the regulation of e-commerce', dated June 
2001, at paragraph 5.5. Further discussion on this topic is 
also provided in the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision Electronic Banking Group White Paper 
'Electronic Banking Risk Management Issues for Bank
O O
Supervisors', dated October 2000, page 17 and in an earlier 
White Paper 'Risk Management for electronic banking and
i O O
electronic money activities', dated March 1998, 18 - 25. 
Given the internet is a new medium, new means of 
assessing the risks for both buyers and sellers must be 
developed to make the internet a safer place in which to 
conduct business. This is why the concept of authentication 
is considered so important in the electronic environment.
DUTIES IMPOSED ON THE ONLINE BANKS
The FSA and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision have provided advice and guidance to banks 
that have an online presence. Both organisations 
emphasise the need to ensure the Board and Management 
Oversight included people that have the requisite 
expertise to advise and guide them concerning the proper 
functioning of their e-banking systems.
In the FSA's discussion paper, mentioned above, the 
FSA highlighted the advice offered in relation to electronic 
communications at paragraph 9.51, which quotes a 
section from the FSA Conduct of Business Sourcebook, 
COB 1.8.2G states that:
For any electronic communications with a customer, ajirm should:
(1) have in place appropriate arrangements, including 
contingency plans, to ensure the secure transmission and 
receipt of the communication. It should also be able to verify 
the authenticity and integrity oj the communication. The 
arrangements should be proportionate and take into account 
the different levels oj risk in a firm's business;
(2) be able to demonstrate that the customer wishes to 
communicate using thisjorm of media; and
(3) if entering into an agreement, make it clear to the customer 
that a contractual relationship is created that had legal 
consequences.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, in its
May 2001 paper 'Risk Management Principles for 
Electronic Banking', also raised this issue in discussing 
what issues are to be included in relation to Principle 4, 
that 'banks should take appropriate measures to 
authenticate the identity and authorisation of customers 
with whom it conducts business over the internet'. The 
comment to Principle 4 indicated that it is essential for 
banks to confirm that a particular communication, 
transaction or request for access is legitimate. The 
commentarv goes on to state that the bank should use
J O
reliable methods to authenticate the identity and 
authorisation of established customers that wish to initiate 
transactions electronically.
Both the FSA's approach and the views of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision seek to establish a very 
high dutv on banks in relation to online banking. It is
o j o
suggested that no system that is used by banks for online 
transactions can clearly identify a customer nor 
authenticate the authorisation of a customer. At best, a 
bank can use methods that help to establish the probability 
that they are dealing with a customer over the Internet, 
although in the normal course of events, it is possible to say 
with some certainty that most of the transactions entered 
over the Internet will be with customers of the bank.
However, there is a possibility that the bank may be 
dealing with somebody other than a customer. This is why 
it is important for an online bank to evaluate the risks and 
put into place sufficient safeguards to satisfy it that it can 
be sure that the risk of dealing with somebody other than 
the customer is low.
ELECTRONIC AUTHENTICATION
Various means can be used to aid the process of 
authentication over the Internet, but none of them will 
work properly unless both parties to a transaction take the 
same care in assessing the risks that attend their use of the
o
Internet. Whilst there are problems with the various 
methods of reducing risk, providing the level of 
authentication is adequate for the purpose of minimising 
the risk, a particular method or combination of methods 
can be sufficient in a given set of circumstances:
o
• Encryption helps to ensure information is transferred 
without being read by a third party. However, there are 
serious problems with this method if the bank wishes to 
encourage the customer to have a means of encryption 
on their computer. It may be that the customer wishes 
to obtain access to their account from a computer other 
than the one on which the encryption software is based. 
There are a host of other technical issues that make 
encryption problematic, and are dealt with more fully in 
the author's article 'Electronic Signatures in the EU and 
world e-commerce: technical and legal ramifications', 
Computers and Law, December 1999/January 2000, 
Volume 10, Issue 5, 37 - 44; electronic version: 
http://www. itsecurity.com/papers/digsig.htm.
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• The use of electronic signatures can verify the identity of 
the sender (see paragraphs 9.16 to 9.27 of the FSA 
Paper for a short discussion of electronic signatures), 
however, there are serious issues relating to electronic
' o
signatures that need to be addressed by the bank it this 
route is chosen. See the author's paper 'The evidential 
issues relating to electronic signatures', published in the
April/May 2002 edition of The Computer Law and Security 
Report.
• Passwords and user identification codes can provide 
access to protected areas ot a web site. Relying on 
passwords alone can be very dangerous, because hackers 
more easily obtain them than any other form of 
identification.
• Tokens and biometrics can be used on their own or in 
conjunction with one or more of the above methods, 
although biometrics (for instance, scans of the face, iris, 
hand and voice) is difficult to implement at present.
Each method is flawed and is susceptible to misuse and 
interception. Most attempts at authentication used on the 
Internet do not, however, verify the identity of an 
individual. In many cases, even when credit card numbers 
are encrypted, the aim is to ensure the credit card number 
is transferred safely over the Internet, not to link the use of 
the credit card number with the authorised user. Similarly, 
a user may be given a password to enter a web site or part 
of a web site, but the use of the password does not prove 
that the authorised user has used the password to gain entry.
OBLIGATIONS AND LIABILITIES OF THE 
PARTIES
The European Union has also drawn up a Commission 
Recommendation in relation to online banking: 
97/489/EC dated 30 July 1997 concerning transactions by 
electronic payment instruments and in particular the 
relationship between issuer and holder (Official journal L 
208, 02/08/197 P 0052-0058). This Recommendation 
provides, in Article 8, for the liability of the online bank in 
e-banking transactions. Section III provides for the 
obligations and liabilities of the parties to a contract for 
online banking. The customer is required to:
• take all reasonable steps to keep the electronic payment 
instrument safe, together with the means (such as a 
personal identification number or other code) which 
enable it to be used
• notify the bank without delay after becoming aware of 
loss or theft of the electronic payment instrument or the 
means which enable it to be used
• inform the bank of unauthorised transactions on their 
online account
• inform the bank of errors or other irregularities that 
occur with the account.
The liability of the customer, up to the time they inform
the bank of any problem, is a maximum of ECU 150, 
except where the customer has acted with extreme 
negligence in undertaking their duties, or they act 
fraudulently. That the negligent act or omission must be 
extreme suggests the imposition of a lower duty of care. 
One area in which a customer may not be considered to 
be negligent is where, for instance, they do not have high 
quality security measures in place to prevent a hacker 
placing a Trojan horse on their system.
By the terms of Article 6(3), the customer is not liable 
where the payment instrument has been used without
electronic identification. Interestingly, the use of ao y
confidential code or other similar proof of identity on its 
own is not deemed to impose liability on the customer.
The burden of proof falls on the bank under Article 
7(2)(e) to show the transaction was accurately recorded and 
entered into accounts and was not affected by any technical 
breakdown or other deficiency. Whilst an online bank may 
be able to establish evidence to prove the accurate recording 
of transactions, and that there was no other problem, a 
customer may still have the upper hand. For instance, it may 
be that the customer can demonstrate that they could not 
afford (because its cost was disproportionate to the 
benefits) a sufficiently adequate security system to prevent 
hackers placing Trojan horses on their computer. If this is 
so, the customer (especially if a consumer), only needs to 
establish this lack of security on their computer to 
demonstrate under this same Article 7(2)(e) that the 
problem may be been caused by some 'other deficiency' - 
to whit, that they did not have sufficient security on their 
system to prevent a hacker placing a Trojan horse on their 
computer which subsequently permits the hacker to gain 
unauthorised access to the user's online bank account for 
fraudulent means.
The author suggests that, at present, online banks 
cannot achieve the requirements demanded by the FSA or 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Both 
institutions demand the online bank to identify the 
customer and authenticate the authorisation of a 
customer. As far as the author is aware, no online bank can 
achieve such certainty with the technology that is available 
at present. At best, online banks can assess the risks, 
evaluate the different types of authentication available on 
the market, and monitor the customer's accounts closely 
to identify any irregularities (such as attempts at fraud, 
money laundering and the like) at an early stage. @
Stephen Mason
The author is a barrister specialising in e-risks, e-business, data 
protection, interception ojcommunications and commercial law. To 
contact him, send e-mail to stephenmason@stephenmason.co.uk.
He is presently in the process of setting up a new company, 
Pario Communications Limited, bringing IT and the law together.
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